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This paper investigates the relationship between socioeconomic horizontal inequalities 
(inequalities between identity groups), regime type, electoral system, political exclusion of 
minorities and civil conflict onset. A positive link between horizontal inequalities (HIs) and 
violent conflict has been established by some preliminary empirical studies, but no systematic 
large-N study has to date investigated whether and how the political environment can affect this 
relationship. Using Demographic and Health Surveys from 55 developing countries in the period 
1986–2003, I calculate welfare inequalities between ethnic, religious, and regional groups based 
on indicators such as household assets and educational levels. All the HI measures are positively 
associated with conflict, but the effects seem to be most robust when using the regional group 
identifier. The regional HI measures are interacted with terms for regime type; electoral system 
and political exclusion. The results show that the conflict potential of regional HIs is stronger for 
democracies and semi-democracies than for autocracies. Institutional arrangements also seem to 
matter since the positive effect of socioeconomic HIs on civil war increases with the level of 
inclusiveness of the electoral system. Furthermore, the interaction between political exclusion 
and socioeconomic regional HIs seems to make countries particularly at risk for conflict. This 
suggests that what is required to secure peace in developing countries is the combination of 






















































































































Several studies of civil war have concluded that economic inequality between individuals does 
not increase the risk of internal armed conflict. This is perhaps not so surprising. Even though an 
individual may feel frustrated if he is poor compared to other individuals in society, he will not 
start a rebellion on his own. Civil wars are organized group conflicts, not a matter of individuals 
randomly committing violence against each other. Hence, we should not neglect the group aspect 
of human well-being and conflict. Systematic inequalities that coincide with ethnic, religious or 
geographical cleavages in a country are often referred to as horizontal inequalities (or inter-group 
inequalities). Case studies of particular countries as well as some statistical studies have found 
that such inequalities between identity groups tend to be associated with a higher risk of internal 
conflict. However, the emergence of violent group mobilization in a country with sharp 
horizontal inequalities may depend on the characteristics of the political regime. For example, in 
an autocracy, grievances that stem from group inequalities are likely to be large and frequent but 
state repression may prevent them from being openly expressed. This paper investigates the 
relationship between horizontal inequalities, political environment, and civil war in developing 
countries. Based on national survey data from 55 countries I calculate welfare inequalities 
between ethnic, religious, and regional groups for each country using indicators such as 
household assets and educational levels. All the inequality measures, but particularly regional 
inequality, are positively associated with higher risks of conflict outbreak. Furthermore, it seems 
that the conflict potential of regional inequality is stronger for pure democratic and intermediate 
regimes than for pure autocratic regimes. Institutional arrangements also seem to matter. In fact 
it seems that the conflict potential of horizontal inequalities increases with more inclusive 
electoral systems. Finally, the presence of both regional inequalities and political exclusion of 
minority groups seems to make countries particularly at risk of conflict. The main policy-
implication of these findings is that the combination of politically and economically inclusive 
government is required to secure peace in developing countries.  
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The Post-Conflict Transitions Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in 
progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about post-conflict development (more information 
about the Post-Conflict Transitions Project can be found at 
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This paper addresses the interplay between socioeconomic and identity-related factors in civil 
conflict, guided by a comprehensive approach to organized group conflict, which has been 
brought to the fore by Stewart (2000; 2002) as the concept of horizontal inequalities (HIs).
1 In 
brief, the argument is that inequalities that coincide with identity cleavages (such as ethnicity, 
religion or regional affiliation) may enhance group grievances and thus facilitate mobilization for 
conflict. In a series of case studies Stewart (2002) found that various dimensions of HIs 
provoked some kind of conflict, ranging from a high level of criminality in Brazil to civil war in 
Uganda and Sri Lanka. In order to test whether these findings can be generalized beyond the 
particular case studies there is a need for large-N investigations. Drawing on national survey 
data, Østby (2005a) has provided quantitative evidence that Stewart’s findings hold when 
socioeconomic inequalities between ethnic groups are tested systematically across 33 developing 
countries. She also found similar effects for horizontal inequalities at the regional level with a 
much larger sample (Østby, 2005b), whereas Brown (2005) reports statistical evidence for a 
positive effect on conflict of horizontal inequalities between religious groups.   
An important issue that has not been systematically addressed to date is whether 
horizontal inequalities are especially conflict-provoking under certain political conditions. To my 
knowledge, there has been little systematic theorization of the role of political institutions (such 
as regime type, and electoral system) in ameliorating (or exacerbating) the conflict potential of 
horizontal inequalities. This paper examines the independent and interactive effects of 
socioeconomic horizontal inequalities and regime type, electoral system, as well as actual 
political exclusion of minority groups. I put forth specific hypotheses as to how the political 
environment interacts with socioeconomic horizontal inequalities. For instance, I expect that 
horizontal inequalities may be particularly explosive in democratic and semi-democratic regimes 
because the relatively deprived groups have both a strong motive and the opportunity for violent 
mobilization. In order to test these hypotheses I conduct a large-N analysis of civil conflict in up 
to 55
2 developing countries in the period 1986–2003. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a theoretical framework for the 
relationship between horizontal inequalities and conflict, with a special focus on three different 
group identifiers: ethnicity, religion, and regional affinity. Section 3 discusses the possible 
impact of regime type, electoral system, and political exclusion of minority groups in mitigating 
                                                 
1 Horizontal inequality should be distinguished from ‘vertical’ inequality, which measures inequality between individuals in a 
society, regardless of ethnic affiliation or other group characteristics of the population. Recent large-N contributions of civil war 
(e.g Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003) tend to dismiss inequality as a grievance factor, based on such a vertical 
measure of inequality, hence ignoring the impact of HIs. 
2 Although the DHS surveys allow me to calculate HIs for 61 countries, 6 of these disappeared from the regression analysis either 
because there was a conflict going on during the entire period 1986–2003  implying that all conflict years were deleted, or due to 
missing observations on certain of the other variables in the analysis for the entire period 1986-2003 (India; Myanmar; Liberia; 




the nexus between socioeconomic horizontal inequalities and conflict. Section 4 presents the data 
and research design. Section 5 provides the results from the empirical tests. The terms of 
socioeconomic HIs show a positive effect on conflict onset for both the welfare indicators 
(household assets and education levels), and across all the three group identifiers (ethnic, 
religious and regional). Moreover, the results indicate that this effect is influenced by regime 
type. The conflict potential of HIs seems to be stronger in democracies and semi-democracies 
than in autocracies. I also find some evidence that not only the level of democracy, but also the 
institutional setup within the democracies may be of importance here. Although the results are 
not very robust across various indicators of social welfare (household assets and education), the 
trend seems to be that the positive effect of socioeconomic horizontal inequalities on civil war 
increases with the level of inclusiveness of the electoral system. Finally, although direct political 
exclusion shows no separate effect on conflict, it seems strongly to enforce the positive 
relationship between regional HIs and conflict. The last section concludes. 
2  Horizontal Inequalities and Civil Conflict 
Stewart (2002: 1) defines horizontal inequalities as ‘systematic inequalities between culturally 
formed groups’, such as ethnic, religious or regional groups. Systematic, socioeconomic 
inequalities between identity groups often have their origin in historical circumstances, such as 
colonial policies, which privileged some groups over others. Sometimes, however, horizontal 
inequalities are not caused by deliberate agency at all but simply become evident for example 
when traditional peoples on the periphery of modernizing societies are drawn into closer contact 
with more powerful and technologically proficient groups (Gurr, 2000).
3 An initial advantage 
often leads to long-term cumulative advantages, as resources and education allow the more 
privileged groups to secure further advantages. Likewise, group deprivation tends to be 
reproduced over time, like in South Africa – even after apartheid (see e.g. World Bank, 2006: 1). 
A shared cultural identity may be a powerful organizing principle for a group. First of all, 
it overcomes the collective action problem (Olson, 1965) whereby people are unable to cooperate 
because of mutual suspicions. However, there is reason to believe that a shared identity is not a 
sufficient factor to produce conflict. In line with this, Murshed & Gates (2005) argue that some 
well-defined grievances are required for identity-based conflict. 
Given that groups are the central units in conflicts the question then is how they are 
mobilized. Stewart (2000) shows how different identity bases have been the source of group 
differentiation and mobilization: In central Africa, ethnicity has been the major basis of group 
categorization; in Central America, group identification and organization has developed along 
social class lines, with some overlapping ethnic dimensions; and in the Balkans and Northern 
Ireland religion has been the primary feature of categorization. However, regional location is a 
source of group differentiation, which often coincides with ethnic or linguistic cleavages, like for 
                                                 
3 Without analyzing each country in depth it is hard to tell whether group inequalities predate repression or not. Furthermore, 
objective measures of group inequalities do not necessarily perfectly reflect people’s perceptions of such inequalities. An 
ongoing project at Centre for Research on Inequality Ethnicity and Human Security (CRISE) at the University of Oxford, 
involves mapping people’s perceptions of group inequalities in eight countries based on particular perception surveys. This seems 
as a promising start for studying the degree to which people’s grievances correspond with objective group inequalities in society.  
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example in Uganda (Minority Rights Group International, 1997) and Zambia (Posner, 2004). The 
question of regional, or spatial, inequality has become increasingly important over recent years, 
and has begun to attract significant interest among scholars and policy-makers. In most 
developing countries, there is a sense that regional inequalities within countries in terms of 
economic activities and social indicators are rising (Kanbur & Venables, 2005).  
Stewart (2000; 2002) does not explicitly specify what kind of cultural identifier is most 
relevant for conflict, but proposes that  one can often use regional data to proxy differences 
among ethnicities since regional location tends to coincide with ethnic or language divisions 
(Stewart, 2000: 247, 255). Moreover, data on group inequalities are far more accessible for 
regional than ethnic or religious groups, since questions concerning ethnic affiliation are often 
dropped or at least not published in national surveys and censuses. However, regional groups 
may also be important in their own right: In a natural field experiment among the Chewa and 
Tumbuka groups in Zambia Posner (2004: 543) found that the regional cohesion seemed to be 
stronger than the claims of ethnic affiliation:
4 
‘Whether or not a cleavage matters would seem to depend not at all on the material from 
which it is built. That material can be as sturdy as the traits, customs, norms, and practices 
that a professional ethnographer might identify as flimsy as an arbitrary boundary drawn by 
an uninformed colonial officer’. 
 
In general, why should horizontal inequalities be relevant for conflict? The most obvious 
answer to this question relates to the effect of collective grievances. Members of disadvantaged 
groups are likely to feel frustration and antagonism, especially when their relative deprivation is 
the result of actual exploitation and discrimination, which is apparently often the case (for 
example in Senegal and Uganda). Indeed, Horowitz (2000) holds that in most cases conflicts are 
initiated by the less privileged groups. Despite the intuitive logic of this argument, one cannot, 
however, assume that it is only resentment on the part of the disadvantaged groups that may 
cause political instability. The privileged groups may also attack the unprivileged, fearing that 
the latter may demand more resources and political power (Stweart, 2000). According to 
Tadjoeddin (2003) this is actually what happened in Indonesia, where conflicts often stem from 
confrontations between the central authorities and several richer provinces (in terms of natural 
resources) whose people are upset by the center’s use of their region’s wealth to subsidize poorer 
regions.  
When people in rich regions perceive the central government’s policies as unfair and 
authoritarian, they may see greater autonomy, or even secession, as a better alternative than the 
status quo. As Aristotle said, ‘Inferiors revolt in order that they may be equal, and equals that 
they may be superior’ (quoted in Sigelman & Simpson, 1977: 106). For example, privileged 
groups that are geographically concentrated may demand independence, such as the Basques in 
Spain. In line with this logic, the initiative to conflict may come from the richest and most 
privileged groups as well as the poorest and most deprived groups. Both types of reactions point 
to the conclusion that a society of high horizontal inequalities has a higher risk of civil war than 
societies without such inequalities. It is easier to maintain group cohesiveness and motivation for 
rebellion if the elite can draw on ethnic, religious, or regional differences to construct a well-
                                                 
4 Nevertheless, it should not be ignored that some of the worst forms of ethnic attacks have been non-regional, such as the 
conflict between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda.  
7 
 
defined identity group with a common enemy. However, probably what matters more than the 
identity bases between which the cleavage is created is whether the groups are systematically 
different in terms of economic and social welfare. This leads to my first hypothesis: 
H1:  Countries with severe socioeconomic horizontal inequalities are particularly likely to 
experience civil conflicts, ceteris paribus. 
3  Mediating Effects of the Political Environment on the HI–
Conflict Nexus 
Rogowski & MacRae (2004), among others, have demonstrated that political institutions tend to 
co-vary with socioeconomic inequality in society. For example, societies with clientelistic 
politics are often associated with extreme economic inequality
5, and democracies are 
characterized by greater economic equality between rich and poor than autocracies. Even within 
the set of democratic regimes, institutions and inequality seem to correlate.  Countries with 
majoritarian electoral institutions, for example, display greater economic inequality than 
countries with proportional methods of election (PR).  
The bulk of studies on inequality and institutions focus on inequality between 
individuals. One could expect, however, that the findings presented above also hold for the 
relationship between institutions and group-based inequalities. Alternatively, one could argue 
that requirements for plurality would force coalitions of identity groups and hence mitigate 
horizontal inequalities.
6 However, establishing a causal link between horizontal inequalities and 
political institutions is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, its focus lies in investigating how 
the political environment in a country may influence the relationship between horizontal 
inequalities and civil conflict onset. 
3.1  The Impact of Democracy Level 
According to Rothchild (1983) ‘group disparities and unequal exchange are, in and of 
themselves, insufficient to explain the course of interethnic conflict’. Stewart (2000: 11) argues 
that the sheer existence of horizontal inequalities may not spur conflict ‘if there is a strong state 
which suppresses it or if ideological elements are such that the inequalities are not widely 
perceived’. If this is the case, the emergence of violent group mobilization in countries with 
sharp HIs may depend on the characteristics of the political regime.  
The relationship between regime type and civil conflict has been widely studied. Hegre et 
al. (2001) have demonstrated an inverse U-shaped relation between the level of democracy and 
the incidence of civil war over time, concluding that semi-democracies are indeed the most prone 
to civil strife. At both extremes, in autocracies and democracies, civil wars are rare – and even 
rarer under a democracy than under an autocracy. However, in a semi democracy, they argue, the 
combination of both grievances and the opportunity to rebel is at its peak. In a democracy 
                                                 
5 It might also be the case that clientelism is very widespread in early stages of development. 
6 One should also note a possible reverse causality, implying that political inequalities might lead to economic inequalities.  
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grievances are generally rare and more moderate while there are plenty of possibilities to express 
these grievances and to secure change through channels other than violence. In an autocracy, on 
the other hand, grievances are likely to be large and frequent but state repression may prevent 
them from being openly expressed. In a semi democracy, both grievances and opportunities exist 
for violent conflict. This suggests that state failure is more likely in between autocracy and well-
functioning democracy.  
The first interaction I investigate in this paper is that between horizontal inequalities and 
regime type. Regime characteristics may provide the incentives for deprived groups to riot 
against the government, as autocratic regimes are likely to have a very restricted recruitment 
process both for political and economic positions (Goldstone, 2001). Autocracies have a 
tendency to exacerbate inequality (Rogowski & MacRae, 2004). Consequently, one could reason 
that when horizontal inequalities are pervasive, autocracies are likely to be more at risk of 
conflict than democracies. This paper turns this reasoning upside-down arguing that it is rather 
democratic regimes that suffer from the most serious effects of horizontal inequalities. The 
rationale for this is elaborated below. 
The theory of the democratic peace makes a heroic assumption: that democracies are 
actually responsive and do address group grievances. Intuitively, this makes perfect sense. 
Democracies are by definition expected to be more responsive than autocracies, if for no other 
reason than that they usually entertain a free press, which makes it harder to ignore petitions 
from below and because governments can be voted out. However, being more responsive than an 
ideal autocracy is not sufficient to argue that a democracy is able to avoid all potential conflicts.
7 
If, for various reasons, a democracy is unable to secure universally basic satisfaction and ensure 
a certain level of group equity, a whole set of new dynamics may appear. The opportunity to 
rebel is still present, but it is now combined with the presence of strong group grievances, or 
motives. In other words, in a country with both a suppressive regime and persistent horizontal 
inequalities, there will be very little opportunity to mobilize although grievances among the 
disadvantaged groups are likely to be very strong indeed. In a democracy with sharp horizontal 
inequalities on the other hand, opportunities and grievances are both present. A democracy is, 
however, expected to host moderate inequalities and consequently fewer grievances between 
identity groups. This is due to the existence of several peaceful channels through which 
relatively deprived groups may express and voice their potential grievances and try to influence 
the process of redistribution through democratic means. However, if this effort does not reduce 
the growing gap between the expected and the actual outcome for the relatively disadvantaged 
groups, it may cause frustration and facilitate the mobilization of people to engage in conflict. 
This argument was originally expressed by Davies (1962) as the J-curve of need satisfaction and 
revolution. In line with this reasoning one should expect the most conflict prone societies to be 
democracies with sharp horizontal inequalities. Hence, I propose the following hypothesis: 
H2:  The positive effect of socioeconomic horizontal inequalities on civil conflict onset is     
stronger for democracies and semi-democracies than for autocracies, ceteris paribus. 
                                                 
7 This fits with some of the findings in Aydin & Gates’ (2005) work on genocide. They provide empirical evidence of an inverse 
relationship between decision-making constraints in policymaking and leaders’ incentive to target civilians. The level of political 
participation and openness of executive recruitment are however not associated with geno-/politicide.   
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With regard to H2, it should be noted that by ‘semi democracies’ I here refer to regimes which 
are neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic. However, such regimes are often also 
transitional polities. Political change is complicated, and democratization can be marked by 
increased risk of internal conflict (Hegre et al., 2001). For example, voting may threaten the 
power of particular groups, which may use violence during elections or immediately post-
election. This may be so because, while willing to accept democratic institutions in principle, 
these groups may not be willing to accept the transfer of power that is involved.
8 In line with 
this, Horowitz (1993) found that political change is particularly likely to be accompanied by civil 
conflict in countries with different ethnic minorities. 
Hegre et al. (2001: 33) conclude that ‘intermediate regimes’, or semi democracies, are 
most prone to civil war, even when they have had time to stabilize from a regime change.  
However, the authors also note that in order to assess whether intermediate regime or regime 
transition (or both) are significant, one needs to control for each factor. Following this advice, I 
control for the time since regime change when testing H2. 
3.2  The Impact of the Electoral System 
Political inclusion of minority groups is necessary to avoid the monopolization of political power 
by one ethnic group or another. Inclusion, however, does not follow automatically from all forms 
of democratic institutions (Rogowski & MacRae, 2004).  Hence, I also consider the impact of a 
country’s level of political inclusiveness, proxied by its electoral system.  Reynal-Querol 
(2002a,b) shows that what matters for conflict is not necessarily simply the degree of political 
freedom (or democracy), but rather the combination of this and the system of representation of 
the voters in government. More specifically, she found that proportional systems have a lower 
risk of conflict than majoritarian systems. Her explanation of this result is that the opportunity 
cost of rebellion is higher under proportional systems because such systems are likely to be more 
inclusive and curb grievances. It could also be the case that the lower risk of conflict in 
proportional systems is simply due to the fact that these systems are likely to be more inclusive 
and hence curb grievances. Reynal-Querol’s results corroborate with Binningsbø (2005), who in 
a large-N study of 118 post conflict societies between 1985 and 2002 found that power-sharing 
institutions as recommended by Lijphart (e.g. 1999), notably proportional representation systems 
and territorial autonomy, were positively associated with lasting peace. Despite such findings, 
Lijphart’s theory about consociational democracy in plural societies has also been met with 
scepticism.
9 For example, van den Berghe (2002) argues that the institutional model of 
consociational democracy mostly benefits the ruling elites.
10 Furthermore, Horowitz (2000) has 
criticized Lijphart on the grounds that the heterogeneous countries in Europe which form the 
basis of Lijphart’ s theory are not sufficiently comparable to deeply divided countries in Africa 
and Asia. In fact, Horowitz argues that a proportional representation system does not necessarily 
                                                 
8 Thanks to Frances Stewart for raising this point. 
9 See Binningsbø (2005: 11–12) for an overview of this critique. 
10 However, this could be true and yet also be pro-peace.  
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create compromise or moderate attitudes, but may actually fuel such differences, as it can 
encourage ethnic or religious political parties.
11 Lebanon might be a good example of this. 
Based on case studies of Kenya, Uganda, and Sri Lanka, Stewart & O’Sullivan (1998) 
argue that democratic institutions are not sufficient to prevent conflict in strongly divided 
societies, and that redesigning democratic institutions in order to reduce conflict can fail to do so, 
or even accentuate it, as in Sri Lanka. They conclude that in order to prevent conflict there is a 
need for inclusive government – politically as well as economically. This entails not only 
political participation by all major groups, but also a spread of the economic benefits throughout 
society.  
In countries with strong socioeconomic horizontal inequalities, but yet a high level of 
political inclusiveness, Stewart & O’Sullivan (1998) note that political parties and leaders tend to 
accentuate ethnic divisions in order to gain support by their kinsmen.  This in turn can provoke 
violence. Also, it is my argument that the levels of frustration among the economically relatively 
deprived will be particularly high in democracies with highly inclusive electoral systems which 
despite this institutional arrangement fail to even out, or at least reduce, systematic 
socioeconomic inequalities between identity groups. Hence, I expect that: 
H3:  The conflict potential of socioeconomic horizontal inequalities increases with more 
inclusive electoral systems, ceteris paribus. 
3.3  The Impact of Political Exclusion of Minorities 
Regime type and formal political institutions, such as the electoral system, do not necessarily 
reflect the distributional politics in a society.
12 Furthermore, there are examples of democratic 
countries which nonetheless restrict the political participation of certain minority groups, notably 
several Latin American countries. According to Stewart (2000), consistent horizontal inequalities 
over a number of dimensions may be as relevant to conflict as the actual coefficient of variation 
with respect to any one dimension. Can one expect more negative consequences where HIs are 
inconsistent across dimensions (e.g. where one group is favoured in terms of economic assets, 
but relatively deprived concerning access to the political system) than where they are consistent? 
Stewart (2000) holds that countries in which horizontal inequalities are consistent across 
different dimensions of inequality have a greater risk of conflict than countries in which 
horizontal inequalities are nonexistent or inconsistent. 
Langer (2005) further develops this argument in a study of violent group mobilization 
and conflict in Côte d'Ivoire. He focuses on socioeconomic horizontal inequalities at the mass 
level and political horizontal inequalities at the elite level, arguing that the simultaneous presence 
of these phenomena can be especially explosive for two reasons: First, in such situations the 
excluded political elites have strong incentives to mobilize their supporters for violent conflict 
                                                 
11 See also Wilkinson (2004), who found that systems with an intermediate number of political parties are more prone to ethnic 
conflict than systems with two or more than four parties.  If this is the case it is not necessarily the electoral system as such which 
matters regarding conflict risk in plural societies 
12 In fact, the correlation between regime type and political discrimination is –.09 in my dataset.  
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along group lines, and secondly, with widespread socioeconomic inequalities, the elites are likely 
to gain support among their ethnic constituencies quite easily. According to Langer (2005) the 
absence of political horizontal inequalities among the elites reduces the risk of violent group 
mobilization, even if there are severe socioeconomic divisions between different ethnic and 
regional groups within a country, because in such situations group leaders lack the incentives to 
mobilize their constituents for violent conflict.  This paper tests Langer’s argument with a cross-
national sample. From this follows my final hypothesis: 
H4:  The conflict potential of socioeconomic horizontal inequalities increases with the level of 
political exclusion of minority groups in a country, ceteris paribus. 
4  Data and Research Design 
A statistical analysis of onsets of civil conflicts in developing countries serves as the empirical 
test of the outlined hypotheses. The sample includes all developing countries where at least one 
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) had been conducted during the period 1986–2003 and 
for which the data were available. In total this amounts to 123 national surveys in 61 countries. 
The total number of observations in the dataset add up to 1160 country-years. However, when 
consecutive years of conflict are removed from the analysis a maximum of 806 country-years 
remain.  
4.1  The Dependent Variable: Conflict Onset 
The conflict data are derived from the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD), which 
includes every armed conflict between a state government and an organized opposition group 
that caused at least 25 battle-related deaths per year (Gleditsch et al., 2002). My definition of 
conflict applies the ‘two-year rule’ (see e.g. Buhaug & Gates, 2002): if a conflict falls below the 
casualty threshold for at least two consecutive calendar years, the next observation is coded as a 
separate onset. I merge sub-conflicts that only differ in type (internal vs. internationalized 
internal conflict), and censor consecutive years of conflict.  
4.2 Core  Variables 
The estimates for socioeconomic inequalities within and between regions are based on 
aggregated data from 123 Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) conducted in 61 countries 
during the period 1986–2003. DHS is an ongoing research project which provides data on the 
population, health, and nutrition of women and children in developing countries, funded 
primarily by USAID and administered by Macro International Inc. In a DHS survey, a sample of 
households is selected throughout the entire country and then interviewed using a household 
questionnaire to collect housing characteristics. Women between the ages 15 and 49 are 
interviewed by means of  a women’s questionnaire to collect information mainly on background 
characteristics, children and women’s health and other issues, such as household assets and  
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education level. All of the DHS surveys used in this analysis are nationally representative. Table 
A2 provides a complete list of the surveys (countries and survey years) used in this analysis to 
generate the HI variables. 
Socioeconomic Horizontal Inequalities 
The DHS data provide a rich set of large, representative surveys with nearly identical 
questionnaires, hence presenting a golden opportunity for generating objective measures of 
inequalities across identity groups. However, a challenge is that the DHS surveys generally lack 
information on income or consumption expenditures.  I overcome the absence of such data by 
using the information collected on respondent and household characteristics. More specifically, I 
use two different indicators of socioeconomic welfare to calculate the inequality measures and 
evaluate the hypotheses: a household asset index, and a variable counting the years of education 
for each respondent. 
First, I construct a household asset index, generated on the basis of the following 
variables from the DHS surveys: v119–v125 (dummies for whether or not each household has 
electricity, a radio, a television, a refrigerator, a bicycle, a motorcycle and/or a car). My second 
indicator, schooling inequality, is based on the variable v133 (years of education completed). 
I measure horizontal inequalities in household assets and educational level using three 
different group identifiers from the DHS surveys: ethnicity (v131), religion (v130), and region of 
residence (v101). First I calculate the socioeconomic divisions (HIs) between the two largest 
ethnic groups in each country. Second I do the same for the two largest religious groups.
 13 
Finally, I examine horizontal inequality as ratios of welfare scores between the region in which 
the capital is located and the rest of the country.
14 This measure is calculated on the basis of the 
































2 1 ln exp 1        ( 1 )  
where M is the maximum number of household assets; A1 refers to mean asset score of 
group 1 (e.g. the capital region) and A2 is the corresponding mean score of group 2 (e.g. the rest 
of the country). This provides a continuous variable potentially ranging from 0 (the lowest level 
of asset inequality between capital region and the rest of the country) to 1 (the highest level of 
such inequality). The measure of educational inequality is generated along the same lines. For 
countries where multiple surveys have been undertaken, I use linear interpolation to estimate 
inequalities for the intervening years. Otherwise I copy the results from the survey closest in time 
to the subsequent years, within the period 1986–2003 in order to increase the sample to a more 
manageable size. This could imply a problem of endogeneity (i.e. HI could result from former 
conflict instead of vice versa), and it would of course be preferable to have annual data on group 
inequalities for each country. However, as stated earlier, group inequalities tend to be quite 
stable over time, which is also evident from the data for some of the countries which have had 
several surveys during the period 1986–2003. Figures 1 and 2 depict the level of inequality in 
                                                 
13 The group sizes are based on weighted measures of ethnic and religious groups (see Rutstein & Rojas (2003) for details on 
DHS weighing procedures) 
14 The capital is coded based on the CIA World Factbook, various editions.  
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terms of average household assets and years of education for the capital region and the rest of the 
country in Peru and Zimbabwe, respectively for various survey years. In both countries the level 
of inequality has remained relatively stable over the entire period. 
Political Regime Type 
I use data on regime type from the Polity IV data (Marshall & Jaggers, 2003). Like Jaggers & 
Gurr (1995) I compute one single regime indicator, subtracting the score of autocracy from that 
of democracy, ranging from –10 (most autocratic) to 10 (most democratic). In order to test the 
curvilinear relationship between regime type and civil conflict I include a squared term for 
regime type. Finally, in order to assess whether horizontal inequalities are more dangerous in 
certain regime types, I split the polity term into three categories: democracies (6 to 10), semi 
democracies (–5 to 5), and autocracies (–10 to –6), following Ellingsen (2000) and others. I 
include the dummies for semi democracies and autocracies in the analysis, with democracies as 
the reference category. 
In order to test my hypotheses with an alternative operationalization of regime type, I 
also include the term SIP (which stands for ‘Scalar Index of Polities’) proposed by Gates et al. 
(2006).
15 This measure is the average of the scores on the three dimensions: The first dimension 
is the regulation of Executive Recruitment, based on three indicators from the Polity IV dataset: 
‘Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment’ (XRREG), ‘Competitiveness of Executive 
Recruitment’ (XRCOMP), and ‘Openness of Executive Recruitment’ (XROPEN). The second 
dimension characterizes the constraints on the executive and is based on a single indicator 
‘Decision Constraints on the Chief Executive’ (XCONST) from Polity IV. The third dimension 
concerns political participation. Rather than using Gurr’s participation index, Gates et al. (2006) 
base their measure on a slightly modified version of the Polity Participation index from 
Vanhanen’s (2000) Polyarchy dataset. The SIP measure ranges from 0 to 1. Finally, in order to 
test Hypothesis 2, I include interaction terms multiplying regime type and regional HIs.  
Proximity to Regime Transition 
As stated earlier, semi democracies are found to be the most conflict-prone (Ellingsen 2000; 
Hegre et al. 2001). This category includes both regimes in transition and institutionally 
inconsistent regimes. In order to control for whether transitions might make up parts of this 
relationship as opposed to institutionally inconsistent regimes, as suggested by Hegre et al.  
(2001), I introduce a variable measuring the time since regime transition when evaluating 
Hypothesis 2.  Polity IV includes a variable ‘DURABLE’ which measures regime durability (i.e.  
years since regime transition) as a function of the number of years since the most recent regime 
change (defined by a three-point change in the POLITY score over a period of three years or 
                                                 
15 The SIP measures was proposed by Gates et al. (2006) as an alternative to the POLITY IV measure due to various problems 
with the political participation dimension of the latter noted by the authors. Most notably, Gates et al.  point out that analyses of 
conflict which use the Polity measure potentially suffer from endogeneity problems because the Polity coding scheme classifies 
40% of all the polities as ‘factional’ systems, i.e. systems which are particularly likely to be engaged in civil war. See Gates et al. 




less) or the end of transition period defined by the lack of stable political institutions (denoted by 
a standardised authority score). Following Hegre et al. (2001), I then code Proximity of Regime 
Transition as 2^(-years since regime transition/X). I chose 1 as the value of X, which assumes 
that the impact of a regime transition on the probability of domestic armed conflict is initially 
high and then reduced at a constant rate with a half-life of one year.   
Electoral System 
A term measuring the inclusiveness of electoral systems is constructed on the basis of data from 
Golder’s (2005) dataset Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World, 1946–2000.  I 
basically adopt the idea presented in Reynal-Querol (2002a,b), constructing an ordinal variable 
ranging four dummies with respect to political inclusiveness. However, I base my measure on 
Golder’s definition of the electoral system followed in the assembly and type of the executive:  
The variable takes the value ‘0’ if the system is not free (i.e. if it has a POLITY score of -6 or 
less or is coded as an autocracy by Golder (2005), ‘1’ if it has a majoritarian system, ‘2’ if it has 
a mixed system, and ‘3’ if it has a proportional system.  As noted by Reynal-Querol (2002a: 45), 
the election of a president is by definition by majority rule, hence what can make a difference is 
the voting rule followed in the assembly. Hence, presidential systems which use a proportional or 
mixed voting rule in the election of the assembly are coded as ‘2’ in my variable for inclusive 
electoral system. Otherwise, they are coded as ‘1’.  Since the codings of electoral and 
institutional systems are from the end of each year, the variable is lagged one year in order to 
determine causality.   There are about 15% missing observations. Most of these are due to the 
fact that the voting data only go to 2000 (or 2001 when lagged). In order to test whether the level 
of political inclusiveness influences the relationship between horizontal inequality and civil 
conflict, I also include an interaction term multiplying the political inclusiveness and regional 
HIs.  
Political Exclusion of Minorities 
Drawing on the Discrimination Dataset of the Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project (Davenport, 
2003), I include a term for political exclusion of minority groups in a given year. I use the 
variable POLDIS, which is originally coded for each minority group as an ordinal variable 
ranging from 0 (no discrimination) to 4 (exclusion/repressive policy: public policies substantially 
restrict the group’s political participation by comparison with other groups). Aggregating this 
information to the country level I multiply the discrimination index with the population share of 
the minority discriminated against. In case of several minorities the sum of all population 
weighted discrimination indices is taken.
16 For my sample, the new continuous variable ranges 
from 0 (e.g. Tanzania, various years) to 3.56 (Rwanda, 1994). I also include interaction terms 
multiplying the political exclusion and regional HIs. 
                                                 




4.3  Control Variables and Statistical Model 
Achen’s (2002) ‘Rule of Three’, states that every analysis with more than three variables on the 
right-hand side will invariably be invalidated by serious problems of multicollinearity. I do not 
adhere to this rule, but believe that it is wise to keep the control variables at a minimum, 
especially given the limited sample size under study.  
As noted by Hegre & Sambanis (2005) three core variables are almost always included in 
models of civil war onset: the natural log of population; the natural log of per capita GDP; and 
the length of peacetime until the outbreak of a war (i.e. the time since the last conflict). I include 
these three controls, of which the first is particularly relevant due to potential problems of 
spuriousness, given that inequality may be related to the actual level of economic development in 
a society. Data on population size stem from the WDI (World Bank, 2004). The variable is 
interpolated and log-transformed. To proxy economic development I use log-transformed GDP 
per Capita measured in constant 1995 US$, also from the WDI (World Bank, 2004). The variable 
is lagged one year. 
As suggested by Beck, Katz & Tucker (1998), I control for temporal dependence through 
a variable measuring time since the last conflict and three cubic splines that approximate the 
discrete time hazard rates for conflict. Time since the last conflict counts the number of whole 
years since the end of the last conflict (peace years). The statistical tests were conducted using 
STATA, version 8.2 (StataCorp., 2003), and all models were estimated by logit regressions with 
robust standard errors clustered by countries. 
5 Results 
The findings from the empirical tests of theoretical propositions are presented in Tables 1–4. All 
models include the base variables, i.e. the terms for population size, GDP per capita and controls 
for conflict history (peace years and cubic splines). To these I add my various terms for 
horizontal inequalities and interactions of these with the terms for political institutions in order to 
evaluate Hypotheses 1–4.  
5.1  Do HIs Matter for Conflict across Different Group Identifiers? 
Models 1–6 in Table 1 report the effects of socioeconomic horizontal inequalities (measured in 
terms of household assets and education years) with regard to conflict onset. I test the impact of 
HIs between ethnic, religious, and regional groups respectively. As for the control variables the 
results are inconsistent. I fail to find the positive relationship between population size and 
conflict reported by most other studies of civil war (see e.g. Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & 
Laitin, 2003). In model 1 the effect is in fact negative at the10% level, but in Model 2 the effect 
drops below significance. In Models 3–6 the effect is positive but never reaches significance. 
Similarly, the term for GDP yields inconclusive results, and is only negative and significant in 
Models 1 and 2, whereas the sign switches in the rest of the models. However, these results are 
perhaps not so surprising, given that the sample is restricted to low- and medium-income 
countries. When I run the baseline model (i.e. excluding any term for HIs) on a more inclusive  
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sample (up to 147 countries) for the same period, both the terms for population size and GDP per 
capita show the expected effects. Furthermore, when I reran the model with the same sample as 
in Model 6, but no term for HI, the effects of population size and GDP per capita dropped to 
insignificant levels (see Table A3). Finally, the term for years of peace never reaches 
significance in any model, but that may be due to the short time-period (1986–2003).
17 
In contrast to the control variables, the horizontal inequality terms reveal some interesting 
results. My first hypothesis (H1), assuming a higher risk of conflict for countries with severe 
socioeconomic horizontal inequalities is quite well supported in Table 1. All the terms show 
positive significant effects. Models 1 and 2 report the effects of HIs between the two largest 
ethnic groups in a country, Models 3 and 4 report the effects of HIs between the two largest 
religious groups in each country, and Models 5 and 6 report the effects of HIs between the 
capital region and the rest of the country. The reason for the differences in N is the different 
availability of data. All the DHS surveys include questions regarding regional affiliation, but 
several surveys exclude questions about ethnic and religious affiliations.  
As expected, the term for horizontal asset inequality between ethnic groups shows a 
positive significant effect in Model 1. Although only significant at the 10% level, the marginal 
effect is quite strong. For a country with mean values on all the explanatory factors, the 
probability of onset of civil conflict in any given year is 2.3%. If we increase the level of 
horizontal asset inequality to the 95
th percentile while maintaining the other variables at their 
mean, the probability of a conflict onset increases to 6.1%.
18 The effect for educational HI 
between ethnic groups (Model 2) is also positive with the probability of conflict increasing to 
5.4%  Focusing on HIs between religious rather than ethnic groups in Model 3 and 4, the effects 
seem quite similar.
19 Models 5 and 6 both provide strong support for H1, showing that inter-
regional horizontal inequalities increase the risk of conflict both with regard to assets and 
education level. Both coefficients are positive at the 1% significance level, and their effects are 
very similar: If we increase the level of interregional horizontal inequality to the 95
th percentile 
while maintaining the other variables at their mean, the probability of conflict increases from 
about 3.8% to 9.5%.
20 This finding corresponds well with related investigations, such as 
Murshed & Gates (2005) who find that Nepalese districts with severe gaps relative to 
Kathmandu in terms of schooling are associated with higher conflict intensity. 
The data material presented here might be too scarce to convincingly conclude that 
regional inequalities matter more for conflict than HIs between ethnic or religious groups. 
However, since there is more data for regional HIs than ethnic or religious HIs, I conduct the rest 
of the analyses only with the former terms in order to maximize the size of the sample (and 
number of conflicts) when testing the effects of interactions with the institutional variables. 
                                                 
17 It is always the possibility that conflict history (peaceyears) may be explained by other independent variables. Hence, I also ran 
all the models 1-19 without the terms for peaceyears and splines (regressions not shown here), but there were no substantial 
changes in the results. 
18 Marginal effects were calculated with the aid of CLARIFY software in Stata 8.2 (see Tomz et al., 2003). 
19 Increasing the inter-religious HI term for assets and education respectively, the conflict risk increases from 2.9% to 7.2% and 
7.1%. 
20 When I ran Models 5 and 6 with the same sample as Model 1 and 2 (n=473) the results for the inter-regional HI largely hold, 
although the effects are slightly weaker.  
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Ideally, we should know which groups are salient with regard to welfare distribution and conflict 
potential in each society (Stewart, 2000). Some studies measure inequalities between ethnic 
groups (Østby, 2005a), some focus on inequalities between religious groups (Brown, 2005), 
whereas others investigate inequalities between regions (Østby, 2005b). One solution could be to 
calculate group inequalities between all these groups and then simply investigate the conflict 
potential of the most severe variants of inter-group inequalities in each country. However, there 
are potential problems with such an approach as well. First of all the reason why some states 
choose to exclude information about ethnicity and religion, these group factors may be 
particularly explosive (see Strand & Urdal, 2005), and hence the missing information on 
horizontal inequalities between these groups could very well be biased.  Nevertheless I 
calculated such terms of maximum HIs for both asset and educational inequality, and among the 
three different group-identifiers, HIs between regions is the term that correlates most strongly 
with the term for maximum HIs: (r=0.93 for asset HI and r=0.79 for educational HI).
 The 
corresponding values for ethnic HIs are 0.63 and 0.25, and for religious HIs: 0.51 and 0.26. 
5.2  Are HIs More Likely to Lead to Conflict in Democracies? 
Can we expect the effect of horizontal inequalities to be contingent on regime type as indicated 
by H2? This hypothesis is tested in Table 2. First of all, the effect of regional asset HI seems to 
be independent of regime type (Model 7). The positive effect is robust to the inclusion of the 
dummies for autocracy and semi democracy, but there is no significant interaction effect with 
either of the terms. However, the hypothesis is supported in Models 9–11, which include the 
interaction terms of regional educational HI and the various regime variables. First of all, the 
positive effect of horizontal educational inequality is significantly weaker for autocracies than 
for democracies and semi-democracies (Model 9). Although not significantly different from each 
other the effect also seems to be weaker in semi-democracies than in full-fledged democracies. 
In sum, horizontal inequalities seem to be less likely to cause conflict in autocracies. 
Figure 3 visualizes the association between inter-regional educational inequality and the 
estimated probability of conflict onset for the three different regime types, democracies (solid 
line), semi-democracies (dashed line) and autocracies (thin line). The figure shows that for 
relatively low levels of horizontal inequalities (0-0.3) the risk of conflict seems to be lowest for 
the democracies and highest for the autocracies. However, with increasing levels of horizontal 
educational inequality the picture changes quite dramatically: A democracy with strong 
horizontal educational inequality between regions (95
th percentile=0.8) is in fact about twice as 
likely (appr. 14%) to face a conflict onset as an autocracy with the same level of HI (appr. 7%).
21 
In a semi democracy with severe HIs, the risk of conflict is about 11%, but this is not 
significantly different from democracies.  
The relationships between HIs, regime type and conflict onset also hold when I include 
the term for proximity to regime change in Model 10, with the coefficients remaining largely 
                                                 
21 Not surprisingly, there are not many examples of countries in my sample which are democracies that host severe inequalities 
and conflict onset in a given year. One example is the conflict onset in Niger in 1994, corresponding with a lagged polity score of 
8 and a HI (education) score of appr. 0.80.  
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similar. However, as the model demonstrates, proximity to regime change seems to be strongly 
and positively associated with conflict for the developing countries in my sample.
22 
Furthermore, Hypothesis 2 gains further support in Models 11 and 12 where I include the 
two different continuous regime measures, POLITY and SIP. The more democratic the regime, 
the stronger the positive effect of horizontal inequalities for conflict onset. 
5.3  Is the HI-Conflict Nexus Affected by the Electoral System? 
Having demonstrated that regime type seems to influence the relationship between horizontal 
inequality (at least when measured in terms of education levels) and civil conflict onset, I 
continue to address the potential impact of electoral systems, in order to see whether certain 
unequal democracies are more at risk of conflict than others. In Models 13–16 in Table 3 I test 
the interaction effects of socioeconomic inequalities between regions and the level of political 
inclusiveness. Again, both the terms for HI remain strongly positively significant regardless of 
the inclusion of the term for political inclusiveness. The single effect of the latter is negative, 
indicating that conflict risk decreases with increased levels of political inclusiveness, but this 
effect is not significant even at the 10% level. Although with a positive sign, the interaction 
effect of asset HI and political inclusiveness is not significant, as shown in Model 13. However, 
the effect of educational HIs, is positively affected with increased political inclusiveness (Model 
15). This also holds when I control for political regime type. Hence, the results in Table 3 partly 
support Hypothesis 3, which stated that the conflict potential of HIs actually increases with more 
inclusive electoral systems.  
5.4  Socioeconomic HI and Political Exclusion – A Dangerous Mix? 
Finally, I set out to test whether the simultaneous presence of socioeconomic horizontal 
inequalities between the masses and political exclusion (implying horizontal inequalities among 
the elites) can be especially explosive. In Table 4 I include interaction terms between the two 
kinds of inter-regional horizontal inequality in order to investigate whether the effect of 
socioeconomic horizontal inequalities increases with higher levels of political exclusion of 
minority group elites.  
Table 4 reveals that the term for political exclusion never has a separate significant effect, 
and the sign is even negative. However, the variable has a very strong impact on the relationship 
between inter-regional asset inequality and conflict, as demonstrated in by the interaction term 
regional asset HI and political exclusion in Model 18. This relationship is graphed in Figure 4. 
The figure shows that the effect of regional asset HI is positive for all levels of political 
exclusion, but drastically increases with severe political exclusion. The peak for the two curves is 
extremely high – indicating that the risk of a conflict onset in a given year is close to 24%. 
However few observations are found within this range of the variables. An example is Burundi in 
the 90s, with the values 2.55 on political exclusion and 0.74 on inter-regional asset inequality. 
                                                 
22 I also ran all the subsequent models including the term for proximity to transition. The term turned out positive and significant 
in all models, but the other regression results did not change substantively (results not shown here).  
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The interaction term for political exclusion and regional educational HI (Model 20) is 
also strongly positive, but not significantly so. In sum, Table 4 provides some empirical support 
for Hypothesis 4. However, it should be noted that the measure for political exclusion is rather 
crude. It could be worth retesting the hypothesis with disaggregated data at the sub-national 
level.  
6 Concluding  Remarks 
This paper represents a first effort at systematically measuring the impact of the political 
environment on the relationship between socioeconomic horizontal inequalities and civil conflict 
onset. The main finding is that socioeconomic horizontal inequalities seem to be positively 
related with conflict for all the three kinds of group identifiers suggested here (ethnic, religious 
and regional groups). Furthermore the relationship between regional (educational) HIs and 
conflict seems to be affected by regime type and electoral system, as well as the level of political 
exclusion in society. In fact horizontal inequalities seem to be particularly conflict provoking in 
democratic regimes with inclusive electoral systems. This is of course not to say that democracy 
and/or political inclusiveness as such breed conflict, but that countries with sharp socioeconomic 
HIs despite democratic rule and a seemingly politically inclusive system may be particularly at 
risk for conflict. Furthermore, I find a strong interaction effect between regional asset HI and the 
level of de facto political exclusion of certain minorities. In sum, these results provide some 
support to all the Hypotheses 1–4, but the estimates are sensitive to what indicator of inequality 
is used. Sometimes it is the household asset indicator which shows a significant effect, and other 
times it is the education indicator. These two indicators of social wellbeing are quite interrelated 
both in theory and statistical correlation, so it would be risky to speculate too much about their 
potentially different effects. 
Despite some interesting findings, several factors call for caution when interpreting the 
results reported here. First, the sample is limited to developing countries which have hosted 
DHS-surveys in the period 1986–2003, which calls into question the degree to which the results 
can be generalized. Also, within this sample the intra- and extrapolations of inequality values 
could be problematic. However, this should not be too huge a problem, since horizontal 
inequalities seem to remain quite stable over time, as noted above.
23  
Second, there is always a potential problem for producing misleading findings due to 
poor operationalizations of certain variables. Generating summary measures of horizontal 
inequalities at the national level is a challenging task. There is a need to define the relevant 
groups, calculate their respective mean welfare scores, and then measuring inequalities based on 
these scores. Most empirical work on group differences, including the tests presented here, uses 
simple measures of differences in performance between the major groups in society, aggregating 
these for cross–country comparisons. The advantage of such an approach is that the measure is 
very simple and intuitively makes sense. However, it is potentially problematic since it may 
ignore certain politically relevant groups in society (see e.g. Stewart, Brown & Mancini, 2005). 
                                                 
23 Even so, I reran all the models without allowing for any backward extrapolation of the inequality values. Most of the results 
remained similar, but some effects dropped below significance (results not reported here). This procedure radically decreases the 
sample to less than half and the number of conflicts drops to very low figures in many of the models.  
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Following e.g. Mancini (2005: 9) I reran all the models with an alternative measure of horizontal 
inequalities , the group-based coefficient of variation (GCOV)
24, weighted by group size for all 
the groups consisting of more than 1% of the population in each country (results not reported 
here). Most of the effects remained quite similar, but dropped below significance in many 
models. It is hard to say whether this means that horizontal inequalities may be less important 
than suggested here, or if it is just signaling that HIs are extremely complex phenomena and very 
sensitive to different measurement techniques. The implication of the latter seems to be that 
whenever possible, horizontal inequalities should be measured and analyzed at the subnational 
level. A handful of quantitative case studies of particular countries have done exactly this (see 
e.g. Mancini, 2005; Murshed & Gates, 2005; Tadjoeddin, 2003), but this of course requires 
disaggregation of the dependent variable and preferably the other independent variables (see also 
Østby, Nordås & Rød (2006) for a preliminary disaggregated analysis of inter- and intra-regional 
inequalities and civil conflict in 21 African countries). Despite the advantage of disaggregated 
studies of conflict, political variables such as regime type and electoral system (which are 
important indicators in this paper) are by definition country-level variables. Testing the 
combined effects of subnational and national variables could be carried out in a multilevel 
model, (see e.g. Goldstein, 1995). 
The search for the underlying causes of civil wars is an on-going one, and few definitive 
answers can be expected. Yet, because of the heavy costs and human suffering that are 
continuously imposed by on-going civil conflicts, it is important to take some action on the basis 
of our current knowledge. The main policy implication that can be drawn from the results 
reported in this paper is the importance of addressing horizontal inequalities. Political institutions 
are not sufficient to ensure peace. The findings of this paper support Stewart & O’Sullivan’s 
(1998) conclusion drawn from case studies: The combination of two factors seems to be of 
utmost importance in mitigating conflict: First, the establishment of politically inclusive 
government which incorporates representatives from all the major identity groups at the political 
level, and second, the realization of a social system which widely spreads the benefits of 
progress, providing socioeconomic growth among all the significant regional, religious and 
ethnic groups in society. In other words, what seems to be required in order to ensure peace in 
developing countries is the combination of politically and economically inclusive government. 
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HI_Asset  (Ethnic gr.)  3.39*           
  (  1.82)         
HI_Educ.  (Ethnic  gr.)    1.96**       
    (2.02)       
HI_Asset  (Religious  gr.)    3.67**       
    (2.52)         
HI_Educ. (Religious gr.)        1.84**     
      ( 2 . 5 1 )      
HI_Asset  (Regions)        2.70***   
        - 3 . 1 5    
HI_Educ.  (Regions)          2.18*** 
          - 3 . 0 4  
Population (ln)  -0.59*  -0.46   0.053  0.13  0.22  0.17 
  (-1.74)  (-1.50)    (0.18) (0.43) (-0.78)  (-0.63) 
GDP per capita (ln) t-1 -0.81**  -0.67*   0.14 0.28 0.027 0.051 
  (-2.27) (-1.83) (0.41)  (0.78)  (0.1)  (0.2) 
Peaceyears  0.42 0.39 -0.012  0.0057 -0.069  -0.11 
  (1.10) (1.15) (-0.05)  (0.02)  (-0.37)  (-0.58) 
Constant  11.33*  8.37  -4.82 -7.11 -7.26  -6.37 
  (1.71) (1.32) (-0.74)  (-1.04)  (-1.25)  (-1.21) 
LL  -73.57 -73.69 -93.39  -93.34  -136.88  -137.13 
Pseudo  R²  0.112 0.110 0.088  0.089  0.061  0.059 
#  Conflicts  20 20 25  25  36  36 
#  Countries  35 35 41  41  55  55 
N  473 473 566  566  777  777 
Note: Logit regression coefficients, z-values are in parentheses. Estimates for three natural cubic splines not shown 









Table 2.  Logit regression of civil war onset, HIs and regime type, 1986–2003 
 
 
Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10  Model 11  Model 12 
HI_Asset (Regions)  3.11**           
 (2.35)           
HI_Educ.  (Regions)    2.046***  2.50***  2.59***  2.64***  2.89*** 
   (2.98)  (2.82)  (2.82)  (3.19)  (2.84) 
Semidemocracy t-1 0.79  0.67  0.89  0.66     
      (ref.c.: Democracy)  (1.34)  (1.28)  (1.46)  (1.13)     
Autocracy t-1 0.65  0.73  1.07  1.01     
      (ref.c.: Democracy)  (0.94)  (1.20)  (1.63)  (1.53)      
HI_Asset*Semi-Dem -1.36          
 (-0.43)           
HI_Asset*Autocracy -0.89           
 (-0.27)           
HI_Educ.*Semi-Dem     -2.53  -1.89     
     (-1.31)  (-1.04)       
HI_Educ.*Autocracy     -4.11**  -4.56**     
     (-1.99)  (-2.06)     
Polity t-1         -0.038   
         (-1.06)   
HI_Educ.*Polity           0.27**   
         (2.47)   
SIP t-1           -1.25 
           (-1.44) 
HI_Educ.*SIP           6.70** 
           (2.26)   
Proximity of Transition         1.45***     
       (3.30)     
Population (ln)  0.26  0.16  0.14  0.20  0.17  0.21 
 (0.83)  (0.62)  (0.52)  (0.81)  (0.63)  (0.73) 
GDP per capita (ln) t-1 0.044 0.037  0.19  0.23 0.20 0.29 
 (0.16)  (0.14)  (0.69)  (0.86)   (0.71) (0.96) 
Peaceyears -0.068  -0.11  -0.14 -0.060 -0.15  -0.044 
 (-0.37)  (-0.62)  (-0.79)  (-0.35)  (-0.89)  (-0.24) 
Constant -7.075  -6.54  -6.24  -8.14*  -6.80  -8.20 
 (-1.22)  (-1.30)  (-1.27)  (-1.76)    (-1.26)  (-1.44) 
LL -130.63  -131.56  -129.59  -125.10  -130.34  -113.85 
Pseudo R²  0.077  0.070  0.084  0.116  0.079  0.085 
# Conflicts  35  35  35  35  35  31 
# Countries  55  55  55  55  55  53 
N 752  752  752  752  752  648 
Note: Logit regression coefficients, z-values are in parentheses.  Estimates for three natural cubic splines not shown 
in table.  *p < 0.10; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.  
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Table 3. Logit Regression of Civil War Onset, HIs and Electoral Systems, 1986-2003 
 
 
Model 13  Model 14  Model 15  Model 16 
HI_Asset (Regions)  3.34**       
 (2.43)       
HI_Educ. (Regions)    1.99**  2.90***  2.98*** 
   (2.51)  (2.78)  (3.13) 
Inclusive Electoral Syst. (IES) t-1 -0.51  -0.46  -0.75**  -1.30*** 
  (-1.58) (-1.27)  (-2.02) (-2.72) 
HI_Asset*IES 1.403       
 (0.81)       
HI_Educ*IES     2.68*  2.78* 
     (1.85)  (1.72) 
Polity t-1      0.066 
      ( 1 . 2 5 )  
Polity2 t-1      0.0091 
      ( 1 . 1 9 )  
Population  (ln)  0.21 0.12  0.12 0.12 
  (0.67) (0.43)  (0.42) (0.40) 
GDP per capita (ln) t-1  0.18 0.10  0.18 0.12 
  (0.65) (0.40)  (0.70) (0.44) 
Peaceyears 0.021  -0.0091 -0.017 -0.056 
 (0.11)  (-0.05)  (-0.09)  (-0.31) 
Constant -7.50  -5.67  -6.035  -5.90 
  (-1.22) (-1.05)  (-1.12) (-1.08) 
LL  -120.58  -122.31    -120.10  -114.91 
Pseudo R²  0.080  0.067    0.084  0.096 
#  Conflicts  33 33  33 32 
#  Countries  53 53  53 53 
N  661     661  661  640 
Note: Logit regression coefficients, z-values are in parentheses. Estimates for three natural cubic splines not shown 
in table. *p < 0.10; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.  
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Table 4. Logit Regression of Civil War Onset, HIs and Political Exclusion, 1986–2003 
 
 
Model 17  Model 18  Model 19  Model 20 
HI_Asset  (Regions)  3.78** 4.37**    
  (2.19) (2.08)    
HI_Educ.  (Regions)    2.75**  2.91** 
    (2.54)    (2.27) 
Political Exclusion  t-1 -0.088  -0.79  -.050  -0.53 
  (-0.24) (-1.59) (-0.11) (-0.72) 
HI_Asset*Pol_Excl   3.50***    
   (2.59)    
HI_Educ*Pol_Excl     2.48 
     ( 1 . 5 1 )  
Population  (ln) 0.59 0.68 0.436  0.48   
  (1.56)    (1.95)  (1.34)  (1.48)   
GDP per capita (ln) t-1  0.11 0.12 -.027  -0.087   
  (0.29)  (0.29)   (-0.08)    (-0.28) 
Peaceyears 0.083  0.15 .032 0.083 
 (0.43)  (0.73)    (0.14)   (0.38) 
Constant -14.56*  -15.20**  -10.63  -10.03 
  (-1.79) (-2.12) (-1.60) (-1.61) 
LL  -88.87    -86.38  -88.78  -87.24 
Pseudo  R²  0.098 0.123 0.099 0.114 
#  Conflicts  24 24 24 24 
#  Countries  41 41 41 41 
N  547 547 547 547 
Note: Logit regression coefficients, z-values are in parentheses. Estimates for three natural cubic splines not shown 
in table. *p < 0.10; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01.  
29 
 













































































Figure 3. Horizontal Inequality and Conflict Risk by Regime Type (POLITY IV), 



















































Note: Figure 3 is generated on the basis of Model 9 in Table 2. 
 
 
























































Table A1. Summary Statistics of Variables Used in Tables 1–4. 
Variable N  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Conflict Onset  806  0.048 0.215 0  1 
HI_Asset  (Ethnic gr.)  702  0.238  0.174  0.004  0.710 
HI_Educ.  (Ethnic  gr.)  702  0.331 0.251 0.002  0.875 
HI_Asset  (Religious  gr.)  828  0.148 0.120 0.002  0.490 
HI_Educ. (Religious gr.)  828  0.259  0.235  0.000  0.858 
HI_Asset  (Regions)  1098  0.326 0.218 0.010  0.801 
HI_Educ  (Regions)  1098  0.354 0.242 0.001  0.850 
Population (ln)  1069 16.501  1.366  12.845  20.771 
GDP per capita (ln) t-1  1036  7.522 0.780 6.084  9.166 
Polity  t-1  1028  0.369 6.299 -9  10 
Polity2  t-1  1028  39.779 24.944 0  100 
Semidemocracy t-1  1028  0.353 0.478 0  1 
Autocracy t-1  1028  0.292 0.455 0  1 
SIP t-1  893  0.460 0.349 0  0.955 
Proximity to Transition  1074  0.193 0.337 2.47e-32  1 
Inclusive Electoral System t-1  919  0.600 0.870 0  3 
Political Exclusion t-1  809  0.619 0.662 0  3.56 
Peaceyears  1074  12.953 14.740 0  57 
_spline1  1074 -1678.040  2617.469  -12320  0 
_spline2  1074 -6179.320  10518.610  -52118  0 
_spline3  1074 -6858.145  12994.400  -71200  0  
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Table A2. DHS Surveys Used in the Analysis (Country and Survey Year*). 
Country  Year Country  Year Country 
Armenia   2000 India   1992  Senegal  
Bangladesh   1993 India   1998  South Africa  
Bangladesh   1996 Indonesia   1987  Sri Lanka (Ceylon
Bangladesh   1999 Indonesia   1991  Sudan  
Benin   1996 Indonesia   1994  Tanzania/Tangany
Benin   2001 Indonesia   1997  Tanzania/Tangany
Bolivia   1989 Indonesia   2002  Tanzania/Tangany
Bolivia   1994 Kazakhstan   1995  Thailand  
Bolivia   1998 Kazakhstan   1999  Togo  
Brazil   1986 Kenya   1998  Togo  
Brazil   1991 Kenya   2003  Trinidad and Toba
Brazil   1996 Kenya   1989  Tunisia  
Burkina Faso 




(Upper Volta)  1998
Kyrgyz 




(Upper Volta)  2003 Liberia   1986  Uganda  
Burundi   1987
Madagascar 
(Malagasy) 1997  Uganda   
Cameroon   1991 Malawi   1992  Uganda  
Cameroon   1998 Malawi   2000  Uzbekistan  
Central 
African Republic   1994 Mali   1987 
Vietnam, Democr
Rep. 
Chad   1996 Mali   1995 
Vietnam, Democr
Rep. 
Colombia   1986 Mali   2001 
Yemen (Arab 
Republic of Y.) 
Colombia   1990 Mexico   1987  Zambia  
Colombia   1995 Morocco   1987  Zambia  
Colombia   2000 Morocco   1992  Zambia  
Comoros   1996 Mozambique  1997 
Zimbabwe 
(Rhodesia) 
Cote d'Ivoire   1998 Namibia   1992 
Zimbabwe 
(Rhodesia) 




Republic   1986 Nepal   1996   
Dominican 




Republic   1996 Nicaragua   1997   
Dominican 
Republic   1999 Nicaragua   2001   
Dominican 
Republic   2002 Niger   1992   
Ecuador   1987 Niger   1998   
Egypt   1992 Nigeria   1990   
Egypt   1995 Nigeria   1999   
El Salvador   1985 Nigeria   2003   
Ethiopia   2000 Pakistan   1990   
Gabon   2000 Paraguay   1990   
Ghana   1988 Peru   1986   
Ghana   1993 Peru   1992   
Ghana   1998 Peru   1996   
Ghana   2003 Peru   2000   
Guatemala   1987 Philippines   1993   
Guatemala   1995 Philippines   1998   
Guatemala   1998 Rwanda   1992   
Guinea   1999 Rwanda   2000   
Haiti   1994 Senegal   1986   
Haiti   2000 Senegal   1992   
* In some countries the survey was conducted over a two year period. In these cases the table reports the first 
year only.  
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(Dev. ctrs. only) 
Model A2 
(Dev. ctrs. only) 
Model A3 
(Global sample) 
HI_Educ. (Regions)  2.18***     
 -3.04     
Population (ln)  0.17  0.045  0.22** 
 -0.63  (0.20)  (2.13) 
GDP per capita (ln) t-1 0.051  -0.29  -0.42***  
 -0.2  (-1.20)  (-3.13)   
Peaceyears -0.11  -0.16  -0.18 
 (-0.58)  (-0.89)  (-1.24) 
Constant -6.37  -0.87  -2.49   
 (-1.21)  (-0.20)  (-1.15) 
LL -137.13  -140.73  -275.48 
Pseudo R²  0.059  0.034  0.101 
# Conflicts  36  36  69 
# Countries  55  55  147 
N 777  777  2186 
Note: Logit regression coefficients, z-values are in parentheses. Estimates for three natural cubic splines not 
shown in table. *p < 0.10; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01. 
 
 
 